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Crisis · EMPIRICAL · one real event, replayed Measured

Russia–Ukraine war: what a wider war would do to stocks, sector by sector

Last reviewed 2026-11-03 · next review 2027-01-15.

What is happening

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and the war is still going on. There is no ceasefire. The worst case here is that the war spreads, for example to a NATO country.

Russia and Ukraine export much of the world's oil, gas, wheat and fertiliser, and Europe sits next door. When the invasion began, shares in energy, farming, defence and gold rose fast, while airlines, banks and luxury brands fell.

Three ways it could go

Calm case · Ceasefire

The fighting stops under a general ceasefire or a peace deal. We do not size this case: when we tested past peace news (the 2022 Istanbul talks, the grain deal, the 2025 Trump–Putin call and summit), shares did not move in a pattern we could rely on.

We put the chance of this at about 1 in 7 (very unlikely).

Middle case · Grinding War

The war goes on much as now: fighting along the front, strikes on cities and energy sites, talks without a deal. Shares already reflect this, so we show no further move.

We put the chance of this at about 8 in 10 (likely).

Severe case · Wider War

The war spreads, for example to a NATO country such as Poland or the Baltic states. We show what each kind of share actually did in the first two weeks after the 2022 invasion: farming, defence, gas and gold shares rose by 10% to 16%, while airlines fell about 15% and luxury brands and banks fell 7% to 9%. U.S. shares as a whole barely moved. It is one real fortnight replayed, not a prediction of the size.

We put the chance of this at about 1 in 10 (very unlikely).

Which sectors are exposed

In the case we rate most likely (Grinding War), the model shows no further move for any sector.

The modelled move of a typical holding in each sector, versus today's prices, if markets reacted as they did in February 2022. A map of exposure, not a price forecast.
SectorCalm caseCeasefireMiddle caseGrinding WarSevere caseWider War
Airlines—0.0%▼ −14.7%
Luxury—0.0%▼ −9.4%
Financials—0.0%▼ −7.1%
EM bonds—0.0%▼ −6.0%
Autos—0.0%▼ −5.9%
EM equities—0.0%▼ −4.4%
Semiconductors—0.0%▼ −0.7%
Big tech—0.0%▼ −0.5%
Broad market—0.0%▼ −0.1%
Gulf producers—0.0%▲ +2.7%
Energy producers—0.0%▲ +8.4%
Utilities—0.0%▲ +8.6%
Tankers—0.0%▲ +8.7%
Gold—0.0%▲ +10.3%
LNG—0.0%▲ +10.5%
Defence—0.0%▲ +12.1%
Reconstruction—0.0%▲ +12.1%
Agriculture & food—0.0%▲ +16.1%

Ceasefire: no figure. We do not size a ceasefire: past peace news (the 2022 Istanbul talks, the grain deal, the 2025 Trump–Putin talks) moved shares in ways our test could not predict.

Measured from one real event: the wider-war case replays what shares did in the first two weeks after the 2022 invasion, as they moved then. Not scaled to any other size.

How sure are we?

Partly. The bad case is what each kind of share actually did in the first two weeks after the 2022 invasion, replayed and never scaled. We tested whether later bad news and peace news moved shares the same way: they did not, reliably. So we cannot say how a different-sized shock would play out, and the ceasefire case is not sized. We file the move under slower growth; how it splits was not measured.

How we built this, with every source →

What to watch next

  • A general ceasefire or peace agreement takes effect
  • Russian forces strike or enter a NATO country, or NATO invokes Article 4 or 5
  • A new institutional estimate of a wider war or a settlement
  • Russia tests, deploys or uses a nuclear weapon

Your own holdings

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